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The United States appears to have an increasingly weakening ability to attract and retain genomics scientists.
Scientific and technological innovations by highly skilled scientists and inventors are 
critical to the long-term economic health of 
the United States. These scientists enable the 
creation and flow of scientific research and 
technologies from public institutions such as 
universities to private firms and vice versa by 
forming vital linkages between them1. The 
exchange of new ideas and the commercial-
ization of promising scientific and technologi-
cal innovations have resulted in the formation 
of new high-technology startups2,3, growth 
opportunities within entrepreneurial and 
established science-based firms4, and jobs 
creation5. These form the backbone of the 
scientific innovation ecosystem in the United 
States. A potential brain drain of scientists and 
inventors from the United States, or a failure 
to attract them to the United States at previ-
ous levels, could challenge its leading role in 
science and technology, and undermine its 
long-term economic resilience.
Although bright scientists have been drawn 
to the United States by its world-class universi-
ties, dynamic companies, availability of fund-
ing and free socioeconomic environments for 
scientific research, anecdotal evidence from 
space exploration6, high-energy physics7 and 
biotech8 increasingly point to the possibility 
that the United States might no longer be able 
to retain or attract these scientific researchers 
and inventors at previous levels. A Kauffman 
Foundation–funded survey9 suggests that, 
increasingly, the United States is less able to 
retain and attract new scientific talent, as more 
scientists are returning to emerging econo-
mies such as Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(BRIC) and, to a lesser extent, to other non-US 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.
Apart from such anecdotal evidence, there 
has been little or no large-scale systematic 
examination of the degree of a possible decline 
in scientific talent retention and attraction to 
the United States compared with the rest of the 
world, and how the productivity of scientists 
in the United States has changed over time.
In the following article, we address these 
important questions by providing the first 
detailed longitudinal assessment of the mobil-
ity, retention and productivity of scientists in 
a specific field of biology in the United States 
relative to the rest of the world, particularly 
the non-US OECD and BRIC countries. The 
field we chose as our focus is genomics as it has 
been an integral part of biotech and genom-
ics innovation10 since the Human Genome 
Project—a 13-year, $3.8-billion research 
effort, which was one of the largest science 
projects ever funded by the US Department 
of Energy and the US National Institutes of 
Health. Furthermore, many genomics innova-
tions covered by patents have demonstrated 
a high level of novelty and utility and form 
the major sources of downstream revenue for 
healthcare, biotech and pharmaceutical com-
panies11.
Study design and methodology
We studied the entire population of 5,809 
scientists who have contributed to innova-
tion in genomics and undertook the first step 
to commercialization by having at least one 
granted genomics patent by 2005. Following 
prior research12, the definition of a genomics 
patent granted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) is highly specific 
in its identification of patents that actually 
claim human nucleotide sequences. The sam-
pling approach based on inventors with at least 
one granted patent is also consistent with pre-
vious studies13. We constructed and traced the 
detailed location and mobility patterns of each 
of these scientists across the world through 
their organizational affiliation each year over 
a 22-year period from 1988—the publication 
year of the first matching genomics paper to 
the genomics patent14—until 2009. 1988 is 
also the landmark year when the first con-
certed genome research program was started, 
as recommended by the US Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment and US 
National Academy of Sciences National 
Research Council committees.
The location for each scientist is captured 
from scientific publications collected from 
the ISI Web of Science (Thomson) database 
(which offers one of the most comprehensive 
coverage of peer-reviewed scientific research 
articles and the addresses of the scientists). 
To identify and track their location, we first 
downloaded all the publications for all of the 
scientists in our sample. Then, in any given 
year, as long as they had at least one publica-
tion in that year, scientists were assigned to the 
organization address that was listed as their 
affiliation on the cover page of the publica-
tion. This was done automatically for cases 
where Web of Science provided precise tag-
ging of an address to a scientist and it was done 
manually (i.e., by visual inspection of the cover 
page of the actual article) whenever this was 
not the case. This information is supplemented 
with scientists’ curriculum vitae or online 
career profiles from official university or firm 
websites, where applicable. (Further details of 
the data set construction are available upon 
request.)
The scientists in our data set produced a 
total of 37,647 unique patents and 264,531 
unique publications from 1988 to 2009; an 
average of 6.48 patents and 49.54 publications 
per scientist within this period. About 80% 
of the scientist-year observations captured a 
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public sector address, which includes univer-
sities, university hospitals and other public 
research institutes, whereas the remaining 
20% captured a private sector address of a 
firm.
Proportion and number of  
genomics scientists
Out first question was, is the United States los-
ing scientists to other countries? Because the 
“entry” of genomics scientists into our sample 
is defined by either the first genomics patent 
application or paper publication, we report 
the results of our analyses from 1988 onward. 
We found that there was an initial increase of 
7.3% in the proportion of all genomics scien-
tists residing in the United States, from 0.58 
in 1988 to 0.62 in 1996. However, this was 
followed by a decrease of 11.8% to fewer than 
0.55 in 2009 (Fig. 1a). The trajectories were 
similar for “star” scientists—the top 10% of the 
scientists in our sample based on either cumu-
lative patents granted or cumulative citations 
to patents. The top 10% of the scientists based 
on cumulative scientific publications experi-
enced an even sharper decrease (17%), from 
0.58 in 1996 to less than 0.48 in 2009. Further 
investigation shows that this pattern of overall 
decrease was similar among more or less expe-
rienced scientists, based on their year of first 
patent application or scientific publication.
This contrasts with the situation in the non-
US OECD countries where the proportion 
of genomics scientists first decreased by 9%, 
from almost 0.40 in 1988 to 0.36 in 1996, but 
increased by more than 13% to about 0.41 in 
2009 (Fig. 1b). Similarly, for the BRIC coun-
tries, the proportion of genomics scientists first 
decreased from 0.020 in 1988 to 0.015 in 1996, 
but increased by 137% to 0.036 in 2009 (Fig. 1c). 
In particular, the proportions of genomics 
scientists in China and India from 1996–2009 
grew by 165% and 85%, respectively.
Furthermore, the average amount of time 
these scientists spent residing in the United 
States (holding either permanent or temporary 
positions) over the previous 3, 5 and 7 years 
fell by 13%, 11.6% and 8.4%, respectively, from 
1996 to 2009. In contrast to this pattern, the 
average amount of time these scientists spent at 
positions in non-US OECD countries increased 
by 14.7%, 12.5% and 7.8% between 1996 and 
2009 for the previous 3, 5 and 7 years, respec-
tively. Likewise, BRIC countries experienced 
an increased presence of these scientists, as evi-
denced by the 121%, 102% and 74% increases 
between 1996 and 2009 for the previous 3, 5 
and 7 years, respectively (details available upon 
request). To the extent that geographic proxim-
ity of scientists facilitates greater transfer and 
spillover of (both codified and especially tacit) 
knowledge and knowledge recombination to 
produce innovations15–18, a reduction in the 
attraction and retention of genomics scien-
tists in the United States may have undesirable 
consequences regarding knowledge creation, 
sharing and innovative activities in the United 
States, compared with earlier times where the 
presence of such scientists in the United States 
was higher.
Do the losses differ between the public and 
private sectors? Further investigation revealed 
that the declining trend in the proportion of 
all genomics scientists residing in the United 
States since the mid-1990s has been driven pri-
marily by the reduction of scientists from the 
public sector—universities, university hospitals 
and public research institutes. The proportion 
of all genomics scientists in the public sector 
who resided in the United States was 0.58 in 
1996 but dropped by 13.1% to fewer than 0.51 
in 2009 (Fig. 2a). On the other hand, the pro-
portion of all scientists affiliated with private 
sector firms who resided in the United States 
first experienced an increase from 0.68 in 1988 
to 0.74 in 1996 and remained relatively stable 
until 2009 at 0.74 (Fig. 2a). The scientists who 
belonged to the top 10% based on cumulative 
patents granted, cumulative citations to patents 
0.65
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Figure 1  Proportion of scientists in different countries. (a) Proportion of scientists in the United States. 
(b) Proportion of scientists in the United States and non-US OECD countries. The non-US OECD 
countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom. (c) Proportion of scientists in the BRIC countries.
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sector might appear surprising at first, it could 
reflect the tendencies of many genomics com-
panies, especially the disproportionate num-
ber of small and medium ones, in the period of 
our study, to engage in open science (through 
scientific publications) to both attract the best 
scientific talent and provide potential investors 
with validation of their platforms. This will-
ingness to publish contrasts with the behavior 
of larger corporations, such as big biotech and 
pharmas, which were more likely to discourage 
open science and which prefer trade secrets.
Although the productivity of scientists in the 
public sector outside the United States was also 
higher than that of scientists in the private sec-
tor outside the United States, the gap widened 
from the mid-1990s to 2009. This suggests a 
relative increase in productivity in terms of sci-
entific publications for scientists in the public 
sector outside the United States compared with 
that of the scientists in the country over the 
past two decades. Analyses using only genom-
ics publications yielded similar and consistent 
results (available upon request).
Figure 4 shows the innovative productivity 
lar year (t). A genomics scientist in the United 
States produced an average of 1.27 scientific 
articles in 1988. This increased to about 1.83 
in 1996 but decreased to less than 1.70 in 2009. 
On the other hand, productivity for scientists 
who were not in the United States climbed sub-
stantially from 1.51 in 1988 to 2.57 in 2009, 
representing an increase of 71%. The average 
scientific productivity of genomics scientists 
not residing in the United States was consis-
tently higher than those in the United States. 
The difference was small until 1996 but grew 
through 2009. Using an alternative data set 
of genomics publications—scientific articles 
authored by genomics scientists in our sample 
published between 1988 and 2009 where a 
genomics-related keyword19 appeared in either 
the title or the abstract of the publication—we 
obtained similar and consistent results (avail-
able upon request).
Scientific productivity in the public sector in 
the United States was consistently higher than 
that in the private sector in the United States, 
although the difference has remained small. 
Although the strong showing of the private 
or cumulative scientific publications showed 
similar trends for the public and private sec-
tors. Likewise, this same pattern held for sub-
samples of more, or less, experienced scientists.
Comparing these trends in the United States 
with the situation in the non-US OECD coun-
tries (Fig. 2b), we found the opposite pattern. 
The proportion of all scientists in the public 
sector who resided in non-US OECD countries 
increased steadily from 0.39 in 1996 by more 
than 12.4% to 0.44 in 2009. On the other hand, 
the proportion of all scientists in the private 
sector who resided in non-US OECD countries 
decreased by about 2% from 0.26 in 1996 to 
0.25 in 2009. Similarly, most of the increase in 
the BRIC countries came from scientists who 
were in the public sector. The proportion of 
scientists in the public sector in BRIC coun-
tries increased by 121%, from 0.019 in 1996 to 
0.043 in 2009.
The changes in the absolute number of sci-
entists in our sample over time are consistent 
with the trends indicated by the proportions 
we report. Because Figure 2a shows that the 
decrease in the United States was driven largely 
by public scientists, we focus here on public 
scientists. (Other figures on the absolute num-
ber of scientists are available upon request.) 
Figure 3 depicts the absolute number of sci-
entists in the United States and in non-US 
OECD countries who were in the public sector. 
The drop in the absolute number of scientists 
in the public sector was much steeper in the 
United States than in non-US OECD countries. 
Taking the years 1996 and 2005, the 2005 figure 
for the United States was only 81% of what it 
was in 1996 (i.e., the number of scientists was 
1,249 in 2005 and 1,543 in 1996). In contrast, in 
non-US, OECD countries, the 2005 figure was 
99% of what it was in 1996 (i.e., the number of 
scientists was 1,027 in 2005 and 1,038 in 1996).
Furthermore, analyzing the subsample of 
scientists for whom we had an address in every 
year produced a consistent pattern with that 
displayed in Figure 3. We found a decreas-
ing trend since the mid-1990s in the number 
of scientists in the public sector who were in 
the United States whereas the opposite trend 
was observed for non-US OECD countries. If 
we use this same sub-sample to consider the 
overall number of scientists, regardless of sec-
tor, over time for the United States and non-
US OECD countries, we again see a consistent 
pattern.
Productivity trends
What are the scientific and innovative pro-
ductivity trends of these genomics scientists? 
We measured the scientific productivity of a 
researcher as the average number of scientific 
papers published per individual in a particu-
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Figure 2  Trends in genomic scientists in the public and private sectors from 1988 to 2009.  
(a) Proportion of scientists in the United States, broken down by public and private sector.  
(b) Proportion of scientists in non-US OECD countries, broken down by public and private sector.
CAREERS  AND  RECRU ITMENT
np
g
© 
20
14
 N
at
ur
e A
m
er
ic
a,
 In
c.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
956 volume 32   NumBeR 9   SePTemBeR 2014   nature biotechnology
United States did not gain much against their 
counterparts in non-US public institutions.
We also conducted additional analysis to 
check whether any of the decline in the num-
ber of US genomics scientists and innovative 
productivity we observed was simply due to 
the obsolescence of certain areas in genomics 
technology, which might reduce the likelihood 
of patenting in these areas or reduce the sub-
sequent impact of these patents. To do this, we 
identified and constructed a data set of patents 
based on a group of 29 six-digit ‘cutting edge’ 
USPTO patent classes—including proteomics, 
metabolomics, epigenetics, synthetic biology 
and molecular engineering—and another 
group of 109 ‘non-cutting-edge’ classes, both 
within the areas the genomics scientists in our 
sample worked on (details of the identification 
and construction of the data set are available 
upon request). We then compared the number 
of patented inventions (as a proxy for inventive 
activity) and citations to patents (as a proxy for 
impact) in these two different groups of classes.
Our analysis shows that the temporal pat-
terns of innovative activity in cutting-edge and 
non-cutting-edge classes (within the research 
areas engaged in by the genomics scientists in 
our sample) were similar—in terms of either 
the production or the impact of these patented 
inventions (details available upon request). 
This suggests that even though there might be 
other differences between the cutting-edge and 
non-cutting-edge areas within the broader field 
of research we consider, it seems that genomics 
intellectual property even in non-cutting-edge 
areas of industrial application continued to gar-
ner a level of activity, attention and impact that 
was close to the work in the cutting-edge areas. 
Therefore, to the extent that the presence of 
scientists in this field in the United States was 
lower than before, and geographic proximity is 
beneficial in the recombination and transfer of 
knowledge and the production of innovations, 
As expected, Figure 4 shows that scien-
tists in the private sector firms in the United 
States consistently produced more genom-
ics inventions than those in universities and 
public research institutes in the United States. 
Similarly, scientists in the private sector out-
side the United States had higher innovative 
productivity than those in the public sector 
outside the United States. Moreover, further 
analysis suggests that the difference in the 
innovative productivity of scientists between 
private and public sectors in the United States 
increased substantially over from 1988 to 2005 
whereas that difference for scientists outside 
the United States decreased slightly. Scientists 
in the private sector firms in the United States 
gained substantially in innovative productivity 
compared with their counterparts in non-US 
firms. This might reflect the faster expansion 
of the US biotech industry, and in particular, 
US genomics companies, than the expansion 
of enterprises in other countries over the same 
period20. On the contrary, scientists in uni-
versities and public research institutes in the 
of the scientists measured as the mean number 
of patents awarded three years into the future 
(t + 3) for each scientist in a particular year (t). 
Therefore, we computed the average innova-
tive productivity for each scientist from 1988 to 
2006. We report t + 3 years because it takes on 
average about 3.3 years between the application 
and grant of a genomics patent14. We replicated 
our analyses using alternative cut-offs such as 
t, t + 2 and t + 4 and the patterns depicted in 
Figure 4 remain consistent.
It should be noted that the sharp increase 
in the average number of patents granted 
to US private firms in 2003 and 2004 was 
likely due to the major changes in patent 
law as stipulated by the American Inventors 
Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA). The publi-
cation provisions of AIPA and the corre-
sponding new rules provide for mandatory 
publication of all new nonprovisional util-
ity patent applications filed on or after 
November 29, 2000. Under the new rule, 
a patent application has to be published at 
around 18 months from the earliest priority 
date claimed. To avoid such mandatory dis-
closure, a substantial increase in the number 
of genomics-related patent applications by 
firms took place in 2000. As these applica-
tions take about 3 to 4 years on the average 
to be granted, one sees the uptick in granted 
patents in 2003 and 2004. Another factor 
that might have contributed to this increase 
is that the patent claims granted by the 
USPTO in specific classes may have become 
narrower or more stringent over the years, 
especially since the early 2000s, on what is 
patentable matter and utility. These changes 
might have prompted more patent filings for 
full genes, cDNAs and expressed sequence 
tags, which likely accounted for the increase 
in patents granted in 2003 and 2004, once the 
USPTO cleared the backlog.
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Figure 3 Number of scientists who are in the public sector who are in the United States and non-US 
OECD countries.
Figure 4  Patents granted to scientists, broken down by US/non-US and by private/public sector.
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direction in how such access varies across time 
and geography.
Conclusions
Three salient findings stand out from our 
study. First, the proportion and number of 
genomics scientists and the amount of time 
they spent residing in the United States 
decreased from the mid-1990s to 2009. This 
contrasts with the increase in the non-US 
OECD countries and BRIC countries, par-
ticularly in China and India. This could sug-
gest an important change in the ability of the 
United States to attract and retain genomics 
scientists at previous levels. Second, the loss 
was driven largely by public sector scientists 
in the United States, and public sector scien-
tists accounted for ~80% of all scientist-year 
observations in our study. On the other hand, 
public sector scientists made up most of the 
gain in non-US OECD and the BRIC coun-
tries. This could point to a potential long-term 
erosion of the US university-industry linkage 
and a weakening of its innovation ecosystem. 
Third, although the innovative productivity 
of these scientists in both private and public 
sectors in the United States increased over 
two decades, the growth in the public sector 
slowed down relative to the public sector in 
non-US OECD and BRIC countries. This may 
suggest a gradual reduction in the competitive 
advantage of scientists in the public sector in 
the US in generating biotech innovations.
A possible reason for the gradual reduc-
tion in the proportion and number of pub-
lic scientists in the United States could stem 
from issues with the availability of federal 
funding5. Nevertheless, although the increase 
(and decrease) in the proportion and number 
of genomics scientists in the United States, 
particularly in the public sector, correlate with 
the growth (and decline) of federal funding in 
genomics, such as that administered through 
the Human Genome Project21, establishing 
a conclusive causal linkage was beyond the 
scope of this study.
Future studies could investigate the causal 
relationship between government funding (or 
the number of sponsoring organizations in 
the public or private sector), scientific mobil-
ity and innovative productivity. In particu-
lar, funding and patents appear to go hand in 
hand22,23, and future work could investigate 
how temporal and geographic variation in 
funding might explain part of the variation in 
productivity. Focusing on genomics scientists 
has allowed us to examine comprehensively 
the temporal and spatial trajectory of their 
mobility and retention, and their productiv-
ity in terms of patents and publications. To 
the extent that scientists in general are driven 
Together with what our figures depict regard-
ing the decreasing proportion of scientists in 
the United States (Fig. 1a), and in the public 
sector in particular (Fig. 2a), this suggests that, 
over time, the more productive scientists in the 
United States might prefer the US private sector 
to the public one, or more productive scientists 
in the public sector might increasingly prefer to 
remain in, move back to, or spend more time in 
non-US OECD or the BRIC countries. These 
preferences might be tied to changes in the 
availability of public research funding or other 
opportunities. Our aim in this study was to 
establish the pattern with the hope that further 
studies could investigate in detail the factors 
responsible for this pattern.
Limitations and future research 
directions
Our study has some limitations that pres-
ent potentially fruitful avenues for future 
research. First, although the number of pat-
ents is a reasonably good surrogate to analyze 
and compare innovative productivity over 
time, it is an imperfect measure. For example, 
the patent claims granted by the USPTO in 
specific classes may have become narrower 
or more stringent over the years, especially 
since the early 2000s, on what is patentable 
matter and utility. These changes might have 
prompted more patent filings for full genes, 
cDNAs and expressed sequence tags, which 
likely accounted for the increase in patents 
granted in 2003 and 2004 once the USPTO 
cleared the backlog. Second, although we 
consider scientists who have contributed to 
genomics innovation by having at least one 
granted genomics patent as suggested by pre-
vious research13, several biotech patents might 
claim human nucleotide sequences but do not 
in fact directly involve genomics technology. 
This may have resulted in a few cases of the 
inclusion of scientists in our sample who 
might in fact not work directly on genomics 
technology. Third, our study focuses on the 
creation of knowledge and patented inventions 
as a necessary first step in the path leading to 
successful commercialization. Although it is 
important to study the creation of inventions 
and to understand the location of scientists 
who created these inventions, we acknowledge 
that the ability to exploit value is separate from 
the ability to invent and patent. For example, 
inventions patented in the United States might 
not be exploited in the time period we study, or 
they could be exploited by firms from outside 
the United States or vice versa. Fourth, the suc-
cessful commercialization of these inventions 
might be associated with other factors such as 
the availability of and access to risk capital; this 
could be another interesting future research 
the changes in the patterns of the location of 
the scientists in our sample might still have had 
an impact on the change of patenting activity 
and on important research within this area.
Analyzing innovative productivity
As the focus of this study was the innovative 
productivity of genomics scientists who con-
tributed to innovation by having at least one 
genomics patent, we report results from scien-
tist-level regression models using the number 
of patents granted to a scientist three years 
from the current year as the dependent vari-
able. We estimated scientist fixed-effects nega-
tive binomial regressions (all regression results 
available upon request). The predicted values 
calculated from the results show that between 
1991 and 2006, for example, the productivity of 
scientists on average (in terms of granted pat-
ents) increased. Similar results were obtained if 
we used other comparable early and late cut-off 
years. Depending on whether the scientist was 
in the public or private sector and in or outside 
of the United States, this increase ranged from 
an average of 0.67 to 1.25 patents granted per 
scientist. (Using the baseline figures for 1991, 
these increases in average productivity corre-
spond to at least a 200% increase.) Given the 
increased interest and wider applications of 
genomics innovations and the availability of 
additional resources between 1991 and 2006, 
such higher productivity is not surprising. 
However, in light of the decreasing proportion 
of scientists in the public sector who were in 
the United States, and the relatively steady pro-
portion of scientists in the private sector who 
were also located there (Fig. 2a), we wished to 
further explore the possible changes in pro-
ductivity among private/public and in the US/
non-US sets of scientists.
With regard to the increased innovative 
productivity from 1991 to 2006, we found 
that there was a 94% advantage for a scientist 
to be in the private sector in the United States 
(compared with being located in the rest of the 
world) over being in the public sector in the 
United States (compared with being located in 
the rest of the world). To clarify this: a scien-
tist located in the United States from 1991 to 
2006 increased their productivity more than 
a scientist located anywhere else in the world, 
regardless of whether that scientist was in the 
public or private sector. This increase in pro-
ductivity, however, was 94% higher for scien-
tists in the private sector than for those in the 
public sector. On the other hand, scientists in 
the public sector who were not in the United 
States (of which 98.7% were in either non-US 
OECD countries or the BRIC countries) had 
relatively higher growth in their productivity 
than those in the private sector.
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competition. Such major steps might be 
necessary to reverse the trajectory we docu-
ment by retaining and attracting the best and 
brightest scientific talent.
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largely by incentives to publish (and, increas-
ingly, to patent) and are affected by external 
research and infrastructure support, our find-
ings could potentially be generalized to other 
biotech fields. Nevertheless, future studies 
could use a similar approach to study other 
fields to see whether there are differences in 
the trends we have documented.
Lasting economic growth emerges from 
the most advanced science and technol-
ogy24. Scientists and inventors play a piv-
otal role in shaping America’s innovation 
system. Findings from this study illustrate 
an apparent weakening of the ability of the 
United States to attract and retain genom-
ics scientists at previous levels. This could 
be of concern to policymakers and other 
key stakeholders. Relevant government and 
funding agencies should be aware of these 
ongoing trends and might have to rethink 
immigration policy, make available more 
federal funding for major scientific research 
initiatives, which are both basic and applied 
in nature25, and continue reinforcing the US 
innovation ecosystems and scientific entre-
preneurship in the face of increasing global 
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